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Abstract
In	recent	years,	UK	governments	have	implemented	policies	that	emphasise	the	ability	of	parents	to	choose	which	school	they
wish	their	child	to	attend.	Inherently	spatial	school-place	allocation	rules	in	many	areas	have	produced	a	geography	of
inequality	between	parents	that	succeed	and	fail	to	get	their	child	into	preferred	schools	based	upon	where	they	live.	We
present	an	agent-based	simulation	model	developed	to	investigate	the	implications	of	distance-based	school-place	allocation
policies.	We	show	how	a	simple,	abstract	model	can	generate	patterns	of	school	popularity,	performance	and	spatial
distribution	of	pupils	which	are	similar	to	those	observed	in	local	education	authorities	in	London,	UK.	The	model	represents
'school'	and	'parent'	agents.	Parental	'aspiration'	to	send	their	child	to	the	best	performing	school	(as	opposed	to	other	criteria)
is	a	primary	parent	agent	attribute	in	the	model.	This	aspiration	attribute	is	used	as	a	means	to	constrain	the	location	and
movement	of	parent	agents	within	the	modelled	environment.	Results	indicate	that	these	location	and	movement	constraints	are
needed	to	generate	empirical	patterns,	and	that	patterns	are	generated	most	closely	and	consistently	when	schools	agents
differ	in	their	ability	to	increase	pupil	attainment.	Analysis	of	model	output	for	simulations	using	these	mechanisms	shows	how
parent	agents	with	above-average	–	but	not	very	high	–	aspiration	fail	to	get	their	child	a	place	at	their	preferred	school	more
frequently	than	other	parent	agents.	We	highlight	the	kinds	of	alternative	school-place	allocation	rules	and	education	system
policies	the	model	can	be	used	to	investigate.
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	Introduction
1.1 It	has	long	been	recognised	that	space	is	an	important	constraint	on	access	to	high	quality	education	and	health	care	services
(e.g.,	Bradley	et	al.	1978;	McLafferty	1982).	In	the	UK,	provoked	by	demands	to	improve	educational	attainment	and	in	light	of	the
'widening	choice'	agenda	forwarded	by	both	New	Labour	and	Conservative-led	Coalition	governments,	there	has	recently	been
much	interest	in	the	geography	of	inequality	in	education	provision	and	attainment	(e.g.,	Butler	and	Hamnett	2007;	Burgess	and
Briggs	2010;	Harris	and	Johnston	2008;	Gudson	2011).	In	recent	years,	both	New	Labour	and	Conservatives	have	implemented
policies	that	emphasise	the	ability	of	parents	to	choose	which	school	to	send	their	child	to,	in	part	with	the	intention	of	driving	up
educational	standards	(Hamnett	and	Butler	2011).	Despite	this,	evidence	suggests	that	there	has	been	little	change	in	school
intake	composition	(Allen	and	Vignoles	2007;	Gibbons	and	Telhaj	2007).
1.2 Although	work	continues	to	investigate	the	causes	and	consequences	of	educational	policy	using	traditional	quantitative	(e.g.,
Allen	at	al.	2013)	and	qualitative	(e.g.,	Butler	and	Hamnett	2012)	methods,	there	is	clear	scope	for	applying	new	tools	such	as
agent-based	simulation	to	investigate	these	issues	(Tang	et	al.	2007;	Maroulis	et	al.	2010a;	Harland	and	Heppenstall	2012).
However,	very	little	work	in	this	subject	area	has	been	pursued	using	agent-based	modelling	(ABM).	Maroulis	et	al.	(2010b)
examined	the	impacts	of	choice-based	reforms	in	Chicago	Public	Schools	using	an	agent-based	framework	to	show	how	variation
in	individuals'	emphases	in	achievement	led	to	constraints	on	the	number	of	new	schools	that	could	survive	in	a	given	district.
Harland	and	Heppenstall	(2012)	showed	how	simple	rules	allowed	an	agent-based	model	to	reproduce	empirical	school
allocation	data	for	a	region	of	northern	England.	To	our	knowledge,	these	studies	are	the	current	extent	of	the	literature	using
agent-based	simulation	to	investigate	education	systems.
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1.3 One	of	the	primary	advantages	of	an	agent-based	approach	for	examining	spatial	movements	of	individuals,	compared	to	using
analytic	spatial	models	such	as	gravity	or	radiation	models	(e.g.,	Simini	et	al.	2012),	is	the	disaggregated	and	heterogeneous
representation	of	system	elements	it	allows.	Whereas	analytic	models	assume	the	system	elements	being	represented	are
homogenous,	agent-based	approaches	can	represent	heterogeneous	individuals	which	allows	users	to	examine	the	importance
of	differences	between	individuals	for	system-level	outcomes,	and	also	the	consequences	of	system-level	properties	for
particular	individual	system	elements.	Furthermore,	agent-based	simulation	models	represent	environmentally-situated	entities
that	are	capable	of	flexible	autonomous	action	to	meet	desired	objectives	(i.e.,	agents	that	can	act	in	different	ways	depending	on
their	environmental	context;	O'Sullivan	2008).	These	simulation	frameworks	can	represent	spatially-explicit	processes	when	their
model	assumptions	mean	that	the	relative	spatial	location	of	heterogeneous	individuals	influences	the	circumstances,	and
therefore	behaviour,	of	other	simulated	individuals	(e.g.,	Millington	et	al.	2012).	The	degree	to	which	data	informs	the
representation	of	the	world	in	these	models	can	range	from	simple,	abstract	models	used	as	thought	experiments,	through	locally
specific	models	that	aim	to	understand	how	general	socio-economic	processes	play	out	in	particular	settings,	to	highly	detailed
simulations	that	represent	very	large,	multi-dimensional	systems	(O'Sullivan	2008).	Our	approach	here	is	at	the	simple,	abstract
end	of	this	spectrum	and	is	'generative'	(Epstein	1999,	2006)	in	that	we	seek	to	explore	how	the	local	interaction	of	simulated
heterogeneous,	autonomous	agents	can	result	in	the	emergence	of	macroscopic	(societal)	regularities.	Subsequently,	we	can
examine	the	implications	of	the	individual	interactions	that	produce	social	regularities	for	different	groups	of	individuals	(e.g.,	with
similar	attributes).
1.4 Here	we	present	the	initial	development	of	an	agent-based	simulation	model	for	investigating	the	implications	of	UK	local
education	authority	school-place	allocation	policy.	We	begin	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	empirical	macroscopic	(i.e.,	school-level)
relationships	we	aim	to	reproduce,	before	then	presenting	model	structure	and	the	local	interactions	it	represents	(i.e.,	individual
parents'	attributes	and	decision-making).	We	explore	different	sets	of	rules	for	interactions	between	agents	(schools	and	parents)
and	examine	their	impact	on	the	reproduction	of	school-level	relationships	and	the	consequences	for	groups	of	parents	with
similar	attributes.	Finally,	we	discuss	our	results	and	highlight	potentially	useful	ways	forward	for	using	this	modelling	approach	to
examine	social	and	policy-related	questions.
	The	geography	of	inequality	in	UK	state	schooling
2.1 The	state	secondary	school	allocation	process	in	England	and	Wales	is	operated	by	local	educational	authorities	(LEAs).	Within
an	LEA,	parents	can	choose	to	apply	to	a	set	number	of	schools	for	their	child	to	attend,	which	they	rank	in	terms	of	preference.
Using	these	applications	and	rankings,	LEAs	then	allocate	places	to	schools.	With	the	exception	of	selective	(e.g.,	faith)	schools,
the	allocation	process	is	inherently	spatial	as	places	at	over-subscribed	(popular)	schools	are	allocated	according	to	the	distance
a	family	lives	from	the	school	(nearest	being	allocated	first)[1].	The	closer	a	family	lives	to	a	popular	school,	the	better	chance	of
securing	a	place	at	the	school	for	the	child.	This	form	of	'choice',	that	both	fosters	and	aims	to	accommodate	aspirations	of
parents	but	which	requires	a	rationing	mechanism	to	balance	the	supply	and	demand	of	popular	schools,	produces	a	geography
of	inequality	with	winners	and	losers	that	succeed	or	fail	to	get	their	child	into	preferred	schools.
2.2 The	patterns	produced	by	this	educational	geography	of	inequality	can	be	seen	in	empirical	data	on	school	performance,
popularity	and	travel	distances	(Hamnett	and	Butler	2011).	School	performance	is	measured	by	the	percentage	of	students
achieving	five	or	more	General	Certificate	of	Secondary	Education	(GCSE)	grades	of	A*	–	C	(which	we	refer	to	as	GCSE-5+).
School	popularity	can	be	measured	using	the	ratio	of	parent	applications	to	available	places	(A:P)	and	travel	distances	by	the
maximum	distance	which	children	attending	the	school	live	from	it	(MaxDist).	For	empirical	data	on	schools	in	seven	East
London	LEAs	in	2007/08,	Hamnett	and	Butler	(2011)	show	how	the	application	and	allocation	criteria	described	above	result	in	a
positive	relationship	between	A:P	and	GSCE-5+	(see	Table	V	in	Hamnett	and	Butler	2011),	a	negative	relationship	between	A:P
and	MaxDist	(see	Table	VII	in	Hamnett	and	Butler	2011),	and	smaller	MaxDist	for	more	popular	schools	compared	to	less
popular	schools	(see	Figure	5	in	Hamnett	and	Butler	2011).
2.3 To	define	these	patterns	more	quantitatively	so	that	model	output	can	be	better	compared	we	use	publicly	available	data[2]	for	the
Barking	and	Dagenham	LEA	averaged	across	five	years	(2007-2011).	We	fit	linear	regression	models	and	calculate	the
coefficient	of	determination	r2	for	relationships	between	GCSE-5+	and	A:P,	between	A:P	and	MaxDist,	and	between	GCSE-5+
and	MaxDist	(Figure	1).	As	Hamnett	and	Butler	(2011)	found	for	multiple	East	London	LEAs,	these	relationships	show	that
schools	with	higher	percentages	of	students	achieving	five	or	more	GCSEs	at	grades	A*	–	C	are	more	popular	(i.e.,	have	greater
applications	to	places	ratios,	Figure	1a),	that	students	at	more	popular	schools	on	average	live	closer	to	the	school	compared	to
less	popular	schools	(Figure	1b),	and	in	turn,	that	students	at	the	poorest	performing	schools	travel	on	average	farther	to	school
than	those	at	the	best	performing	schools	(Figure	1c).
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Figure	1.	Empirical	school-level	relationships	for	schools	in	Barking	and	Dagenham	2007–2011.	For	each	plot	m	=	regression
coefficient,	p	=	p-value	of	regression,	r2	=	coefficient	of	determination.
2.4 These	empirical	patterns	highlight	the	importance	of	the	location	where	parents	live	for	the	chances	of	getting	their	child	into
popular,	generally	higher	performing,	schools.	However,	interviews	with	parents	in	East	London	have	shown	a	range	of	attitudes
towards	the	importance	of	education,	from	largely	indifferent	to	being	the	highest	priority	(Butler	and	Hamnett	2011).	For	example,
contrast	the	following	two	statements	from	two	parents	in	the	same	area	of	East	London:
"I	think	[education	is]	reasonably	important.	I	wouldn't	put	it	up	there	as	really	top	ranked	just	because,	you
know,	I	think	there's	more	important	things	in	a	child's	life."	(Butler	and	Hamnett	2011,	p.105)
"Oh,	the	single	most	important	thing	that	a	parent	can	give	to	their	children	in	life	is	a	first-class	education"
(Butler	and	Hamnett	2011,	p.98).
2.5 With	the	intention	of	producing	a	simple,	abstract	agent-based	simulation	model	that	can	generate	the	general	empirical	patterns
described	above,	we	focus	on	the	over-arching	concept	of	parental	'aspiration'	to	send	a	child	to	the	best	performing	school
(measured	by	exam	results).	We	use	the	model	to	represent	a	range	of	'aspiration'	regarding	educational	attainment,	from	largely
indifferent	to	high	priority.	Furthermore,	we	use	this	notional	measure	of	aspiration	as	a	means	to	constrain	the	location	and
movement	of	parents	within	a	modelled	environment.	We	examine	different	mechanisms	(i.e.,	model	rule	sets)	to	identify	how
they	influence	generated	patterns	and	examine	the	sensitivity	of	several	key	model	variables.	First	we	describe	the	general
model	structure,	before	then	presenting	results	and	analysis	of	the	different	model	rule-	and	parameter	sets.
	Model	Structure
3.1 Our	description	of	model	structure	uses	selected	parts	of	the	Overview,	Design	concepts,	and	Details	(ODD)	protocol.	The	full
ODD	description	can	be	found	online	with	the	model	code	at	openABM.org[3].
Purpose
3.2 The	purpose	of	this	model	is	to	investigate	mechanisms	underlying	the	geography	of	educational	inequality	in	the	UK	and	the
consequences	of	these	mechanisms	for	individuals	with	varying	attributes	and	mobility.
Entities,	state	variables	and	scales
3.3 Two	types	of	agents	are	represented;	parents	and	schools.	One	iteration	of	the	model	is	assumed	to	be	equivalent	to	a	single
year.	Although	parents	and	schools	have	explicit	spatial	locations,	no	space	scales	are	implied	or	assumed	and	the	model
environment	is	a	torus.	A	torus	is	appropriate	in	our	simple,	abstract	model	to	suppress	boundary	effects	so	that	observed
variation	in	attainment	and	access	to	schools	can	reliably	be	attributed	to	straight-line	distances	between	schools	and	parents
(similar	to	approaches	used	in	urban	segregation	models;	e.g.,	Laurie	and	Jaggi	2003,	Fossett	and	Dietrich	2009).	The	most
important	parent	attribute	is	their	aspiration	to	send	their	child	to	the	best	performing	school.	Aspiration	takes	a	value	from	1	to
100	and	varies	between	parents.	This	range	of	values	represents	variation	in	parents'	attitudes	towards	whether	educational
attainment	(in	terms	of	GCSEs)	is	the	primary	criteria	for	selecting	a	school	(high	values)	or	a	less	important	criteria	in	selecting	a
school	(low	values).	It	reflects	how	some	parents	will	seek	to	maximise	the	possibility	of	their	child	attaining	high	grades	whereas
other	will	be	satisfied	with	less	(in	the	light	of	other	priorities	not	represented	in	this	model).	Parents'	aspiration	values	are	set
when	the	parent	is	created	and	do	not	change	through	time.	Parents	are	assumed	to	have	a	single	child	(not	represented	as	an
individual	agent,	but	implicitly	as	an	attribute	of	the	parent).	Each	parent	has	two	child	attributes;	child-age	and	child-attainment.
Child-age	is	measured	in	years	and	child-attainment	takes	a	value	from	1	to	100.	Both	child-age	and	child-attainment	change
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through	time.	Initially,	parents'	child-attainment	is	equal	to	their	aspiration	and	child-age	has	a	value	of	9.	Parents	have	an	explicit
and	unique	location	(i.e.,	parents	cannot	share	a	location	with	other	parents	or	a	school).	Parents	can	potentially	change	location
once	through	time.
3.4 Schools	have	a	finite	number	of	places	available	for	allocation	to	parents	each	year.	Schools	have	five	academic	year	cohorts
(i.e.,	grades)	of	parents	(pupils)	and	have	a	GCSE-score	attribute	which	is	calculated	as	the	mean	of	child-attainment	values	of
parents	with	child-age	=	15	allocated	to	the	school	(i.e.,	GCSE-receiving	final-year	students[4]).	GCSE-score	can	take	a	value
from	0	to	100.	As	both	allocated	parents	and	child-attainment	can	change	through	time,	so	GCSE-score	can	vary	between
schools	and	through	time.	Schools	have	a	value-added	attribute	which	is	assigned	at	model	initialization	and	can	vary	between
schools	but	does	not	change	through	time.	Value-added	can	take	a	value	between	0.0	and	1.0.	Each	year	schools	record	the
parents	allocated	a	place	and	the	parents	which	applied	to	the	school.	Schools	have	an	explicit	and	unique	location	which	cannot
change	through	time.	School	locations	can	be	random	across	the	model	environment,	or	with	equal	distance	between	each
school	(i.e.,	on	a	grid).
Process	Overview	and	scheduling
3.5 Each	year	existing	parents	in	the	environment	increase	their	child-age	by	a	value	of	1.	School	academic	year	cohorts	are	also
aged	(e.g.,	year	8	parents	become	year	9	parents)	and	parents	allocated	a	school	place	in	the	previous	year	(when	their	child
was	age	10,	now	age	11)	become	year	7.	After	this	increase,	parents	with	child-age	=	16	are	removed	from	the	model
environment,	as	their	children	are	assumed	to	have	received	their	GCSEs	and	left	school.	This	assumption	represents	the	fact
that	households	that	no	longer	have	children	at	school	will	not	be	competing	for	places	at	schools	(and	not	be	occupying	places
at	those	schools)	and	ensures	space	is	available	in	the	environment	for	parents	with	younger	children	applying	for	school	places.
Creating	this	space	is	important	so	that	the	reproduction	of	educational	inequality	can	be	examined	through	time	and	shares
similarities	with	similarly	simple,	abstract	models	of	residential	segregation	that	assume	a	fixed	percentage	of	agents	leave	the
model	environment	in	a	given	timestep	(e.g.,	Portugali	2000;	O'Sullivan	2009).
3.6 New	parents	are	then	added	to	the	model	environment.	The	number	of	new	parents	added	is	given	by	Families	*	Number-of-
Schools.	The	values	of	these	variables	are	specified	by	the	user	at	model	initialization	and	do	not	change	through	time.	New
parents	are	assigned	to	unoccupied	locations	in	the	model	environment.	Location	assignment	can	be	spatially	random	or
constrained	by	aspiration.	If	constrained,	the	mean	aspiration	of	parents	in	the	Moore	neighbourhood	(i.e.,	8	surrounding
locations)	of	each	unoccupied	location	is	calculated	(known	as	location-value;	if	a	given	location	has	no	parents	in	its	Moore
neighbourhood	its	location-value	is	set	to	the	mean	aspiration	of	all	parents	in	the	model	environment).	New	parents	are
assigned	the	unoccupied	location	with	greatest	location-value	which	is	also	less	than	that	parent's	aspiration.	If	no	location
matches	these	criteria	(i.e.,	all	unoccupied	locations	have	location-value	>	new	parent	aspiration)	the	new	parent	is	assigned	the
location	with	the	smallest	location-value.
3.7 Parents	which	have	not	yet	been	allocated	a	school	(i.e.,	those	with	child-age	=	9	or	child-age	=	10)	then	assess	schools.	These
parents	assess	whether	they	believe	they	are	within	the	'catchment'	of	each	school.	Each	year	the	mean	spatial	distance	of	all
allocated	parents	at	a	school	is	calculated.	Parents	assume	they	are	in	a	school	catchment	if	their	distance	to	the	school	is	less
than	the	smallest	mean	distance	for	the	last	parent-memory	years.	The	parent-memory	parameter	is	set	by	the	user	at	model
initialization,	does	not	vary	in	time	or	between	parents,	and	can	take	a	value	from	1	to	5.	Unallocated	parents	also	assess	which
school	they	consider	satisfactory	to	send	their	child	to.	Satisfactory	schools	are	those	with:
(1)
Finally,	these	unallocated	parents	assess	which	'poor'	schools	they	want	to	avoid	sending	their	child.	These	schools	to	be
avoided	are	those	with:
(2)
The	avoided-threshold	parameter	is	a	global	parameter	which	does	not	vary	in	time	or	between	parents	and	can	take	a	value
from	0	to	1.
3.8 Parents	with	child-age	=	9	(i.e.,	one	year	before	they	will	be	allocated	to	a	school)	then	check	if	they	want	to	move	from	their
current	location	to	try	to	increase	their	chance	of	having	their	child	allocated	to	a	satisfactory	school	(in	the	next	year)	by	living
closer	to	that	school.	Parents	rank	the	top	Number-of-Rank	schools	using	one	of	eight	strategies,	depending	on	their
circumstances	(see	Table	1).	They	then	check	locations	in	catchments	of	these	schools	in	rank	order	(starting	with	top	rank)	until
a	location	is	found	or	all	school	catchments	have	been	checked.	Parents	will	not	be	able	to	move	if	there	are	no	unoccupied
locations	in	a	catchment	or	if	availability	of	locations	is	constrained	by	location-value	(see	above).	The	year	in	which	a	child-age	=
9	is	the	only	one	in	which	parents	can	move.	Ultimately,	this	is	not	an	accurate	representation	of	reality	as	parents	could	move
multiple	times	before	and	after	school	allocation.	However,	this	single-move	assumption	is	credible	given	that	aspects	that	may
influence	house	moves	other	than	schooling	(e.g.,	changes	in	family	income	or	size)	are	not	represented	in	this	simple,	abstract
model.
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Table	1:	Idealised	parent	ranking	strategies	for	moving.	Schools	considered	by	parents	to	be
satisfactory	or	to	be	avoided	are	determined	by	Eq.	1	and	Eq.	2,	respectively.
Strategy Criteria Response
1 Believed	to	be	in	no	school
catchment	No	schools	considered
satisfactory	No	schools	avoided
Rank	all	schools	by	GCSE-score	descending
2 Believed	to	be	in	no	school
catchment
No	schools	considered	satisfactory
At	least	one	school	avoided
Rank	all	schools	–	except	those	avoided	–	by	GCSE-
score	descending
3 Believed	to	be	in	no	school
catchment
At	least	one	school	considered
satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	GCSE	score
descending,	then	all	other	schools	by	GCSE	score
descending
4 Believed	to	be	in	no	school
catchment
At	least	one	school	considered
satisfactory
At	least	one	school	avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	GCSE	score
descending,	then	all	other	schools	–	except	those
avoided	–	by	GCSE	score	descending
5 Believed	to	be	in	one	or	more
school	catchment
No	schools	considered	satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	GCSE	score
descending,	then	all	other	schools	by	GCSE	score
descending
6 Believed	to	be	in	at	least	one	school
catchment
No	schools	considered	satisfactory
At	least	one	school	avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	GCSE	score
descending,	then	all	other	schools	–	except	those
avoided	–	by	GCSE	score	descending
7 Believed	to	be	in	at	least	one	school
catchment
At	least	one	school	considered
satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
Do	not	try	to	move
8 Believed	to	be	in	at	least	one	school
catchment
At	least	one	school	considered
satisfactory
At	least	one	school	avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	GCSE	score
descending,	then	all	other	schools	–	except	those
avoided	–	by	GCSE	score	descending
3.9 Parents	with	child-age	=	10	rank	the	top	Number-of-Rank	schools	that	they	will	apply	to	send	their	child	to	using	one	of	eight
strategies	depending	on	their	circumstances	(see	Table	2).	To	determine	which	strategy	to	use,	parents	check	which	school
catchment(s)	they	believe	they	are	located	within	and	whether	there	are	schools	they	deem	satisfactory	to	send	their	child[5].
Table	2:	Idealised	parent	ranking	strategies	for	school	application.	Schools	considered	by	parents	to
be	satisfactory	or	to	be	avoided	are	determined	by	Eq.	1	and	Eq.	2,	respectively.
Strategy Criteria Response
1 Believed	to	be	in	no
school	catchment	No
schools	considered
satisfactory	No	schools
avoided
Rank	all	schools	by	distance	ascending
2 Believed	to	be	in	no
school	catchment
No	schools	considered
satisfactory
At	least	one	school
avoided
Rank	all	schools	–	except	those	avoided	–	by	distance	ascending
3 Believed	to	be	in	no
school	catchment
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	distance	ascending,	then
all	other	schools	by	distance	ascending
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At	least	one	school
considered	satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
4 Believed	to	be	in	no
school	catchment
At	least	one	school
considered	satisfactory
At	least	one	school
avoided
Rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	distance	ascending,	then
all	other	schools	–	except	those	avoided	–	by	distance	ascending
5 Believed	to	be	in	one	or
more	school	catchment
No	schools	considered
satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
Rank	those	schools	believed	to	be	in	the	catchment	of	by	GCSE
score	descending,	then	all	other	schools	by	distance	ascending
6 Believed	to	be	in	at	least
one	school	catchment
No	schools	considered
satisfactory
At	least	one	school
avoided
Except	for	those	schools	avoided,	rank	schools	believed	to	be	in
the	catchment	of	by	GCSE	score	descending	followed	by	all	other
schools	by	distance	ascending
7 Believed	to	be	in	at	least
one	school	catchment
At	least	one	school
considered	satisfactory
No	schools	avoided
Rank	those	schools	believed	to	be	in	the	catchment	of	by	GCSE
score	descending,	then	those	schools	considered	satisfactory	by
distance	ascending,	then	all	others	schools	by	distance	ascending
8 Believed	to	be	in	at	least
one	school	catchment
At	least	one	school
considered	satisfactory
At	least	one	school
avoided
Except	for	those	schools	avoided,	rank	those	schools	believed	to
be	in	the	catchment	of	by	GCSE	score	descending,	then	those
schools	considered	satisfactory	by	distance	ascending,	then	all
other	(non-avoided)	schools	by	distance	ascending
3.10 Schools	then	allocate	places[6]	to	parents	with	child-age	=	10	ready	for	their	child	to	become	a	pupil	of	the	school	the	next	year.
Schools	allocate	applicants	that	ranked	them	highest	first	(starting	with	the	closest	parent	and	allocating	in	ascending	order	of
distance).	Once	all	schools	have	allocated	these	top-ranking	parents,	if	places	remain	unallocated	(i.e.,	if	there	were	less	parents
ranking	them	first	than	total	places	available)	schools	then	allocate	applicants	that	ranked	them	second	(again,	allocating	by
distance	ascending).	This	process	continues	(third	ranks,	fourth	ranks,	etc.)	until	all	parents'	rankings	have	been	checked.
Schools	that	have	remaining	places	after	all	ranked	preferences	have	been	allocated,	then	allocate	remaining	places	to
unallocated	parents	on	distance	(closest	allocated	first	then	by	distance	ascending).	This	approach	to	school-place	allocation
implements	the	Gale-Shapley	(1962)	method	(with	ranking	determined	by	distance	to	school)	as	used	by	LEAs	in	England	(Allen
et	al.	2010).
3.11 Finally,	also	in	preparation	for	the	following	year,	existing	parents	already	allocated	a	place	at	a	school	update	their	child-
attainment	using	the	idealised	relationship:
(3)
where	CA	is	child-attainment,	SVA	is	the	value-added	of	the	school	attended,	SPE	is	School-Peer-Effect,	PE	is	Parent-Effect,
SCA	is	the	mean	child-attainment	of	all	parents	allocated	a	place	at	the	school	and	t	denotes	the	timestep.	Multiple	factors	are
believed	to	influence	changes	in	pupil	attainment	during	their	time	at	secondary	school,	attributable	to	individual	pupils'
backgrounds	(e.g.,	ethnicity	and	class;	Connolly	2006;	Hamnett	et	al.	2007)	and	school-level	factors	(e.g.,	school	composition
and	peer-effects;	Thrupp	et	al.	2002;	Willms	2010).	The	structure	and	composition	of	Eq.	3	allows	the	relative	importance	of
several	factors	to	be	examined.	Specifically,	School-Peer-Effect	and	Parent-Effect	can	take	values	from	0	(no	effect	on	pupil
attainment	through	time)	to	0.5	(large	effect	on	pupil	attainment	through	time)	and	reflect	the	influence	of	the	attainment	of	pupils'
peers	and	the	aspirations	of	their	pupils'	parents	on	attainment.	The	possible	influence	of	factors	beyond	pupils	and	parents
themselves	(i.e.,	facilities,	teachers	etc	of	the	school	itself)	is	reflected	by	value-added.	When	each	of	these	three	variables	is
zero	there	is	no	change	in	pupil	attainment	through	time.	Schools	then	update	their	GCSE-score	to	be	the	mean	of	child-
attainment	of	allocated	parents	with	child-age	=	15	(i.e.,	year	11	pupils).
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	Model	Testing	and	Evaluation
State	Variables
4.1 To	evaluate	and	test	the	model	we	consider	state	variables	at	three	different	levels	of	aggregation	and	scale.	To	measure	spatial
autocorrelation	of	parent	aspiration	at	the	level	of	the	entire	simulated	environment	we	use	Moran's	I,	calculating	the	statistic	and
the	probability	that	the	statistic	is	statistically	significantly	different	from	zero	(p)	for	each	timestep.	We	cannot	estimate	Moran's	I
for	empirical	data	and	so	do	not	consider	this	an	empirical	pattern	by	which	to	assess	the	generative	properties	of	the	model
rules.	However,	this	measure	is	a	useful	means	to	identify	if	local	interactions	rules	result	in	system-level	spatial	patterns	(i.e.,
spatial	autocorrelation	of	parent	agent	attributes).	At	the	school	level	we	measure	GCSE-score	(corresponding	to	GCSE-5+),	A:P
and	MaxDist	and	fit	linear	regression	models	(with	coefficient	and	significance	values	m	and	p,	respectively)	and	calculate	the
coefficient	of	determination	(r2)	for	each	combination	of	pairs	of	these	variables	in	each	timestep	(as	we	did	for	empirical	data	in
Figure	1).	For	regression	models	from	model	output	we	calculate	the	mean	model	coefficient,	mean	r2	and	the	mean	number	of
timesteps	during	a	model	run	in	which	regression	p	>	0.05.	We	use	values	for	m,	p	and	r2	as	indicators	to	compare	how	results
for	different	model	rules	sets	reproduce	the	general	patterns	outlined	above,	using	the	quantified	values	for	our	empirical
regressions	as	a	guide.	Thus,	we	assume	that	model	results	with	larger	absolute	values	of	m,	higher	r2	values	and	lower	p
values	indicate	stronger	reproduction	of	general	empirical	patterns.	At	the	parent	level	we	consider	parent	strategy	for	school
application	(see	Table	2),	application	success,	distance	to	allocated	school,	aspiration,	child-attainment	change,	and	whether	the
parent	moved	or	not	prior	to	allocation.	Parent	application	success	is	evaluated	by	comparing	whether	a	child	was	allocated	a
place	at	their	top	ranked	school	(success	if	so,	otherwise	not).	Change	in	child-attainment	is	the	difference	between	child-
attainment	when	child-age	=	10	(i.e.,	prior	to	entering	school)	and	when	child-age	=	15	(i.e.,	when	receiving	GCSE	results	and
leaving	school).	We	do	not	currently	have	empirical	equivalents	with	which	to	compare	these	measures.
Methods
4.2 To	test	and	evaluate	the	model	we	consider	which	model	rules	and/or	conditions	are	necessary	for	the	model	to	generate	the
school-level	empirical	patterns	described	above	(Section	2).	Hence,	the	approach	is	'generative'	(Epstein	1999).	We	also
examine	how	different	rules	and	model	conditions	influence	spatial	autocorrelation	of	parent	aspiration	across	the	entire	model
environment.	We	evaluate	the	importance	of	the	spatial	distribution	of	schools,	location	constraints,	and	school	value-added
(Table	3).	We	evaluate	the	importance	of	three	model	rule	options:	i)	the	spatial	distribution	of	schools,	by	either	locating	them
randomly	across	the	model	environment	or	regularly	spaced	(on	a	grid);	ii)	the	importance	of	parental	location	constraints,	by
running	the	model	with	and	without	the	constraint	of	location-value;	and	iii)	the	importance	of	school	value-added,	by	either
setting	all	schools'	value-added	to	zero	or	allowing	values	to	vary	randomly	(between	0	and	1).	For	each	of	the	eight	rule-sets	the
combinations	of	these	rule	options	produce	(Table	3),	we	run	the	model	25	times	for	100	timesteps	(with	parameter	values	as
shown	in	Table	4).	For	analysis	we	use	only	the	last	80	timesteps	of	each	model	run	as	random	initialization	means	that	it	takes
at	least	10	timesteps	before	schools	have	had	a	single	cohort	of	students	pass	through	the	school	with	child-attainment	correctly
calculated	(Eq.	3,	and	see	initial	variation	in	variables	in	Figure	2).
Table	3:	Combinations	of	rules	for	model	testing.
Rule	Set Random	Schools Location	Constraints School	Value-Added
1 No Yes Yes
2 No No Yes
3 Yes Yes Yes
4 Yes No Yes
5 No Yes No
6 No No No
7 Yes Yes No
8 Yes No No
Table	4:	Default	parameter	values	used	in	model	runs	(unless	otherwise	specified).
Parameter Value
Families 100
Parent-Memory 5
Number-of-Schools 9
Number-of-Ranks 4
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/1/10.html 8 15/10/2015
Initial-School-GCSE-Distribution Uniform,	1
Parent-Aspiration-Distribution Gaussian,	μ	=	50	σ	=	20
Aspiration-Mean 50
School-Value-Added-Distribution Gaussian,	μ	=	0	σ	=	0.1
Avoided-Threshold 0.5
School-Peer-Effect 0.25
Parent-Effect 0.25
4.3 For	the	model	that	best	generates	empirical	patterns	we	also	perform	sensitivity	analyses	(for	parameters	and	values	as	shown
in	Table	5).
Table	5:	Parameter	values	used	in	sensitivity	analyses.
Parameter	Set Parameter Value
9 Number	of	Ranks 2
10 Number	of	Ranks 6
11 Avoided	Threshold 0.05
12 Avoided	Threshold 0.25
13 Avoided	Threshold 0.75
14 Avoided	Threshold 0.95
15 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.00,	0.00
16 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.25,	0.00
17 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.50,	0.00
18 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.00,	0.25
19 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.50,	0.25
20 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.00,	0.50
21 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.25,	0.50
22 School	Peer	Effect,	Parent	Effect 0.50,	0.50
Results:	Rule	sets
4.4 Relationships	between	state	variables	(Table	6)	indicate	that	the	model	produces	results	which	generate	empirical	patterns	most
closely	and	consistently	(i.e.,	large	m,	high	r2,	low	p)	when	parents	are	constrained	by	where	they	can	live,	when	schools
differentially	add	value	to	pupils'	attainment	and	when	schools	are	not	randomly	located	(i.e.,	Rule	Set	1,	Table	3).	Results
indicate	that	at	least	one	of	the	Location	Constraints	or	School	Value-Added	rules	is	needed	to	generate	the	relationship	between
school	performance	and	popularity	(GCSE-5+	vs.	A:P).	If	neither	is	present	(e.g.,	Rule	Sets	6	and	8),	the	range	of	school
performance	is	very	low	(i.e.,	little	difference	between	maximum	and	minimum	school	GCSE-5+,	Figure	2),	and	therefore	no
clear	preferences	between	schools	arise.	To	generate	strong	spatial	autocorrelation	in	parent	aspiration	the	Location	Constraints
rule	is	needed	(Rule	Sets	1,	3,	5,	7)	as	these	constraints	produce	'neighbourhoods'	of	aspiration	(e.g.,	Figure	3).	In	turn,	when
combined	with	non-random	location	of	schools	(i.e.,	Rule	Sets	1	and	5),	constraining	the	location	of	parents	generates	good
relationships	at	school	level.	Thus,	pattern	in	both	location	of	parents	and	schools	is	required	to	generate	empirical	relationships,
and	this	is	enhanced	when	schools	differ	in	the	value	they	add	to	pupils'	attainment.
Table	6:	Measures	of	relationships	between	key	empirical	variables	for	different	model	rule	sets[7]
Rule GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
Set m r2 p m r2 p m r2 p Stat. p
1 7.89 0.96 0.00 -0.78 0.70 5.58 -0.09 0.65 10.00 0.92 0.00
2 6.88 0.85 0.68 -0.18 0.38 47.20 -0.02 0.36 50.92 0.01 32.50
3 8.53 0.94 0.12 -0.41 0.23 70.16 -0.04 0.20 71.16 0.91 0.00
4 6.51 0.76 4.84 -0.01 0.13 74.68 0.00 0.14 74.44 0.01 31.50
5 6.98 0.97 0.00 -0.67 0.68 8.60 -0.09 0.65 10.96 0.92 0.00
6 1.79 0.30 56.68 0.00 0.12 76.16 0.00 0.11 76.88 0.01 46.00
7 7.36 0.92 2.60 -0.26 0.18 71.92 -0.03 0.16 74.96 0.91 0.00
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8 1.37 0.26 61.40 0.01 0.15 74.44 0.00 0.17 72.56 0.01 54.00
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/1/10.html 10 15/10/2015
Figure	2.	Time	series	of	GCSE	and	range	and	A:P	range.	Solid	lines	are	the	mean	of	25	model	runs	for	the	given	parameter	set.
Shaded	areas	are	the	95%	confidence	interval	around	the	corresponding	mean,	calculated	from	the	standard	error	of	25	model
runs.
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Figure	3.	Example	final	model	state	maps.	Maps	are	of	parent	aspiration	(lighter	shades	are	higher	aspiration).	Schools	are
shown	as	house	icons	(lighter	shades	indicate	higher	GCSE-score).	Numbers	indicate	Rule	Sets	(as	summarised	in	Table	3).
Results:	Sensitivity	analysis
4.5 When	compared	to	results	for	the	best	model	rule	set	(Rule	Set	1),	sensitivity	analysis	results	indicate	that	modelled	school-level
relationships	are	largely	insensitive	to	variation	in	parameters	influencing	parents'	school	ranking	and	child-attainment	change
(Table	7).	The	exception	is	for	higher	values	of	avoided-threshold	(Eq.	2).	When	avoided-threshold	=	0.95	(Parameter	Set	6)
relationships	between	GCSE-5+	and	MaxDist	and	between	A:P	and	MaxDist	break	down	(i.e.,	there	is	no	relationship)	and	for
avoided-threshold	=	0.75	(Parameter	Set	5)	the	relationships	become	weaker	(i.e.,	no	relationship	more	frequently).
Table	7:	Measures	of	relationships	between	key	empirical	variables	for	sensitivity	analyses[8]
Parm GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
Set m r2 p m r2 p m r2 p Stat. p
1 11.21 0.93 0.00 -0.70 0.65 8.76 -0.06 0.61 12.16 0.93 0.00
2 7.66 0.90 0.00 -0.79 0.69 6.08 -0.09 0.60 12.68 0.91 0.00
3 8.35 0.96 0.00 -0.80 0.71 5.00 -0.09 0.67 8.04 0.92 0.00
4 8.09 0.96 0.00 -0.80 0.70 4.12 -0.09 0.66 7.08 0.92 0.00
5 5.39 0.93 0.04 -0.68 0.59 20.56 -0.11 0.53 25.80 0.92 0.00
6 6.12 0.88 0.40 -0.04 0.13 76.52 0.00 0.11 78.12 0.93 0.00
7 9.67 0.95 0.00 -1.06 0.69 7.60 -0.11 0.67 9.12 0.92 0.00
8 10.69 0.93 0.00 -1.18 0.71 5.64 -0.11 0.69 6.44 0.92 0.00
9 10.80 0.93 0.00 -1.13 0.68 9.60 -0.10 0.66 12.40 0.92 0.00
10 8.11 0.95 0.00 -0.84 0.70 5.52 -0.10 0.65 10.28 0.92 0.00
11 7.39 0.96 0.00 -0.71 0.68 7.76 -0.09 0.63 12.32 0.92 0.00
12 7.37 0.96 0.00 -0.72 0.64 10.16 -0.09 0.60 17.76 0.91 0.00
13 7.16 0.96 0.00 -0.68 0.67 8.28 -0.09 0.63 12.92 0.91 0.00
14 7.04 0.97 0.00 -0.66 0.66 9.72 -0.09 0.62 13.12 0.92 0.00
Results:	Parent-level	analysis
4.6 At	the	parent	level,	plots	of	proportions	of	parents	in	classes	of	one	state	variables	against	classes	of	other	state	variables	are
useful	to	identify	relationships	between	those	variables	(e.g.,	Figure	4).	Some	of	these	relationships	are	appropriate	for	verifying
model	function	given	model	structure,	but	others	are	interesting	to	understand	what	the	model	structure	implies	for	parents	with
different	attributes.
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Figure	4.	Relationships	between	variables	at	the	parent-level	of	analysis	(for	Rule	Set	1).
4.7 As	expected,	given	distance-based	school	allocation	rules	in	the	model,	results	show	that	parents	living	closer	to	their	allocated
school	are	more	likely	to	have	ranked	that	school	as	their	top	preference	(Figure	4a).	Furthermore,	of	parents	that	successfully
get	their	child	into	their	top	ranked	school,	more	have	positive	child-attainment	change	(blue	colours	in	Figure	4a)	than	negative
(red	colours).	However,	it	is	not	the	parents	in	the	closest	distance	class	(distance	<	10)	that	have	greatest	positive	child-
attainment	change.	Rather,	on	average	it	is	parents	in	the	second	distance	class	(10–20)	that	achieve	greatest	child-attainment
increases.	For	example,	a	greater	proportion	of	parents	in	the	second	distance	class	have	positive	child-attainment	than	those	in
the	closest	(82%	compared	with	56%)	and	overall	mean	child-attainment	change	is	greater	for	the	second	class	(+6.36)	than	the
closest	(+1.76).	In	contrast,	the	vast	majority	(92%)	of	parents	in	the	fourth	distance	class	and	greater	(i.e.,	allocated	distance	≥
30)	have	negative	child-attainment	change.	Of	parents	in	these	distance	classes,	only	1%	were	successful	in	getting	their	child
into	their	top-ranked	school,	again	highlighting	the	importance	of	distance	allocation	rules	and	their	relationship	with	school	(and
pupil)	performance.
4.8 When	we	consider	relationships	between	parent	aspiration,	allocated	distance	and	whether	parents	have	moved	or	not	(Figure
4b)	we	observe	that	as	aspiration	increases	parents	are	more	likely	to	move.	Parents	that	move	are	more	likely	to	live	in	the
closest	allocated	school	distance	class	(distance	<	10).	No	parents	in	the	farthest	allocated	school	distance	classes	(i.e.,	distance
≥	30)	moved	to	be	in	that	position,	and	these	parents	are	not	those	with	lowest	aspiration.	Rather,	parents	with	higher	than
average,	but	not	very	high,	aspiration	(i.e.,	those	with	aspiration	60–70)	are	most	likely	to	be	allocated	to	a	school	with	distance	≥
30.
4.9 Parents	in	this	medium-high	aspiration	class	(aspiration	60–70)	also	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their	preferred	school	more	often
than	parents	in	other	aspiration	classes	(Figure	4c).	Parents	with	aspiration	≥	70	are	more	likely	to	be	in	a	school	catchment
when	applying	to	a	school	(Figure	4c,	increased	proportions	of	strategies	5–8	in	these	classes).	Furthermore,	as	aspiration
increases,	the	likelihood	of	succeeding	using	strategy	3	to	rank	schools	for	allocation	decreases	(Figure	4c;	i.e.,	the	danger	of	not
being	in	the	school	catchment	of	a	satisfactory	school	is	greater	for	those	with	higher	aspiration).
	Discussion
Model	Structure
5.1 Our	model	testing	and	evaluation	shows	how	differences	between	schools'	performance	(and	therefore	parents'	school
preferences)	combined	with	distance-based	school-place	allocation	rules,	are	needed	to	reproduce	empirically	observed	school-
level	patterns.	The	approach	we	have	used	is	'generative'	(Epstein	1999,	2006),	seeking	to	explain	the	emergence	of
macroscopic	(societal)	regularities	arising	from	the	local	interaction	of	simulated	heterogeneous,	autonomous	agents.	Using	an
agent-based	simulation	model	we	have	generated	observed	macroscopic	regularities	(i.e.,	relationships	between	school
performance,	popularity	and	allocation)	from	the	'bottom	up'	by	simulating	individual	parents'	aspirations	regarding	educational
attainment	and	their	efforts	to	do	so	in	the	face	of	distance-based	school	allocation	rules.
5.2 Starting	with	random	locations	of	parents	and	schools	with	identical	performance	(GCSE-5+),	this	generative	approach	allows	us
to	show	that	either	i)	differences	in	the	abilities	of	parents	to	move	to	locations	near	preferred	schools,	or	ii)	variation	in	the
increases	in	attainment	schools	can	provide	to	pupils	are	needed	to	generate	the	empirical	relationship	between	school	exam
(GCSE)	performance	and	school	popularity.	If	neither	of	these	rules	is	present	in	the	model,	variation	in	school	performance	is
not	produced	(Figure	2)	meaning	that	parents'	school	preferences	are	inconsistent	across	the	modelled	environment	(i.e.,	it	is	not
clear	which	schools	are	better	than	others).	Differences	in	the	abilities	of	parents	to	move	are	important	for	creating
neighbourhoods	(groupings)	of	parents	with	similar	aspiration	(Figure	3;	Moran's	I	in	Table	6).	In	turn,	these	neighbourhoods
mean	that	children	with	similar	initial	attainment	(because	initial	child-attainment	is	equal	to	parent	aspiration)	are	more	likely	to
attend	the	same	school,	reinforcing	improvements	in	school	performance	(via	School-Peer-Effect).	Variation	in	the	improvement
that	schools	can	contribute	to	pupils'	attainment	also	produces	variation	in	school	performance,	but	to	a	lesser	degree	than	the
neighbourhoods	of	aspiration	effect.	We	found	that	increasing	the	range	of	improvement	that	schools	contribute	to	pupil
attainment	(i.e.,	from	σ	=	0.1	for	School-Value-Added-Distribution	to	σ	=	0.5,	Table	4)	does	increase	this	effect,	but	still	does	not
produce	as	consistently	significant	relationships	as	for	parent	location	constraints	(e.g.,	p	for	GCSE-5+	vs.	MaxDist	of	22.48
compared	with	5.58	and	8.60	for	Rule	Sets	1	and	5	respectively,	Table	6).
5.3 Another	model	rule-set	we	investigated	was	the	random	location	of	schools	(i.e.,	Rule	Set	3,	Table	3).	When	schools	are
randomly	located	spatially	across	the	model	environment,	the	empirically-observed	distance	relationships	collapse.	This	is
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because	of	the	abilities	of	parents	to	move	into	desired	school	catchments	and	because	of	the	agent	logic	used	in	the	model.
With	random	school	locations,	schools	are	often	close	together	and	so	parents	can	be	located	in	more	than	a	single	school
catchment	(i.e.,	school	catchments	overlap),	a	situation	which	doesn't	occur	when	schools	are	regularly	spaced.	Consequently,	a
greater	number	of	parents	are	in	school	catchments	when	it	comes	to	parents	ranking	for	allocation	and	schools	allocating,	as
shown	by	greater	proportions	of	parents	in	distance	classes	10–20	and	20–30	using	ranking	strategy	7	than	3	(compare	Figures
5a	and	5b).	The	overlapping	of	school	catchments	also	means	that	parents	are	more	likely	to	succeed	in	getting	their	children	into
their	desired	schools	when	farther	from	them	(compare	Figures	5a	and	5b)	as	parents	near	the	school	may	have	sent	their	child
to	a	different,	but	nearby,	school.	This	situation	implies	the	model	is	not	useful	for	considering	situations	where	schools	are	not
spaced	equally.	However,	in	its	current	form	we	would	not	expect	the	model	to	be	useful	in	this	situation	as	parents'	ranking	logic
for	moving	only	considers	the	single	best	school	(and	its	catchment)	and	does	not	take	account	of	which	locations	in	the
environment	would	allow	them	to	be	in	multiple	(good)	school	catchments.	Consequently,	as	the	model	logic	currently	stands,	the
model	is	best	used	with	regularly	spaced	schools	so	that	parents	are	very	unlikely	to	be	in	more	than	one	school	catchment,	as
the	agent	logic	assumes.
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Figure	5.	Relationship	between	distance	and	strategy	at	parent-level	for	randomly	located	schools	for	a)	Rule	Set	1	and	b)	Rule
Set	3	(specified	in	Table	3).
5.4 Also	in	the	current	model	structure,	three	mechanisms	exist	whereby	feedbacks	between	aspiration	and	child-attainment	can
occur.	These	are	the	assumptions	that:
i.	 initial	child-attainment	is	equal	to	the	aspiration	of	the	parents	(Att=Asp);
ii.	 through	time	at	school	child-attainment	is	influenced	by	the	aspiration	of	the	parent	(PE	in	Eq	3);	and
iii.	 through	time	at	school	child-attainment	is	influenced	by	the	mean	child-attainment	of	school	peers	(SPE	in	Eq	3).
5.5 To	check	the	importance	of	these	assumptions	for	the	generation	of	the	school-level	empirical	relationships	(e.g.,	Figure	1),	we
ran	the	model	for	the	different	combinations	of	these	assumptions	being	present	in	the	model	or	not	(see	Table	8,	while
maintaining	other	assumptions	of	Rule	Set	1[9]).	These	tests	indicate	that	if	the	Att=Asp	assumption	is	absent,	the	model	does
not	generate	the	school-level	empirical	relationships	when	PE	is	also	not	present	(i.e.,	Rule	Sets	10	and	12),	but	performs	better
when	PE	is	present	(i.e.,	Rule	Sets	14	and	15).	Furthermore,	the	SPE	effect	seems	to	be	the	least	important	of	the	three
assumptions	highlighted	above,	as	when	this	assumptions	is	absent	but	the	other	two	assumptions	are	present	school-level
relationships	are	not	affected	(i.e.,	compare	results	for	Rule	Set	13	with	Rule	Set	1).	Neighbourhoods	of	aspiration	are	produced
in	all	combinations	of	assumptions	(indicated	by	high	Moran's	I	values).	These	results	make	sense	as	although	parents	of	similar
aspiration	still	cluster	together,	if	there	is	no	link	between	parent	aspiration	and	child-attainment	(via	either	Att=Asp	or	PE)	little
variation	in	school	performance	is	produced	by	spatial	variation	in	parent	aspiration.	Although	the	Att=Asp	assumption	is	useful,
these	results	imply	that	a	perfect	correlation	between	aspiration	and	initial	child-attainment	is	not	necessary	for	the	model	to
generate	empirical	relationships.
Table	8:	Measures	of	relationships	between	key	empirical	variables	for	aspiration	and	child-attainment
mechanisms.
Rule	Set PE SPE Att=Asp GCSE-5+	vs	A:P GCSE-5+	vs	MaxDist A:P	vs	MaxDist Moran's	I
r2 p r2 p r2 p Stat. p
9 F F T 0.93 0.00 0.60 17.24 0.59 17.68 0.93 0.00
10 F F F 0.90 0.00 0.42 39.52 0.41 43.80 0.92 0.00
11 F T T 0.93 0.00 0.61 17.36 0.61 16.76 0.93 0.00
12 F T F 0.88 0.00 0.44 38.12 0.46 37.36 0.93 0.00
13 T F T 0.95 0.00 0.70 5.52 0.67 8.48 0.92 0.00
14 T F F 0.94 0.00 0.67 11.48 0.64 14.60 0.92 0.00
15 T T F 0.94 0.00 0.68 10.48 0.65 13.88 0.92 0.00
Parent-level	patterns
5.6 Our	generative	approach	to	modelling	has	shown	that	the	consequences	of	our	assumptions	about	the	system	at	the	individual,
parent,	level	can	generate	the	empirically	observed	relationships	and	patterns	at	the	higher,	school,	level.	Although	this	model	is
a	highly	simplified	conceptualisation,	it	allows	us	to	examine	relationships	between	entities	at	the	lower	level	and	between	upper
and	lower	levels	that	would	not	be	possible	(or	at	the	least,	very	difficult)	in	the	real	world.	For	example,	our	parent-level	results
(for	Rule	Set	1,	Table	3)	show	that	in	general	those	in	the	second	distance	class	(distance	10–20)	achieve	greatest	 child-
attainment	increases,	and	not	those	in	the	closest	distance	class	(distance	<	10,	Figure	4a).	This	is	because	those	parents	that
live	in	the	closest	distance	class	have	on	average	greater	aspiration	than	those	in	the	second	distance	class	and	therefore	have
greatest	child-attainment	initially.	Consequently,	the	child-attainment	of	these	closest	parents	is	on	average	more	likely	to
decrease	than	increase.
5.7 Another	interesting	finding	from	our	parent-level	analysis	is	that	those	parents	with	aspiration	60–70	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their
preferred	school	more	often	than	other	parents	(closely	followed	by	those	with	aspiration	50–60,	Figure	4c).	As	noted	in	the
results,	the	likelihood	of	failing	to	get	into	a	preferred	school	using	strategy	3	(rank	schools	considered	satisfactory	by	distance
ascending,	then	all	other	schools	by	distance	ascending,	Table	2)	increases	as	aspiration	increases	(Figure	4c).	Although	a
greater	proportion	of	parents	with	aspiration	70–80	fail	when	using	strategy	3	compared	to	parents	with	aspiration	60–70,	parents
in	this	lower	aspiration	class	have	a	greater	proportion	of	parents	using	this	strategy	overall	(parents	with	higher	aspiration	are
more	likely	to	be	in	a	school	catchment	and	therefore	use	strategies	5–8).	Parents	with	aspiration	60–70	are	no	less	likely	to	find
themselves	outside	a	school	catchment	than	parents	with	lower	aspiration	(Figure	4c)	but	because	their	aspiration	is	higher	they
consider	only	better	schools	satisfactory	for	their	child.	This	means	they	have	fewer	schools	to	rank	(so	distance	to	those	schools
is	likely	to	be	greater),	and	each	of	those	schools	is	more	likely	to	have	greater	numbers	of	parents	deeming	them	satisfactory	to
send	their	child	to	(and	so	these	schools	have	many	parents	ranking	them	as	most	preferred).	In	contrast,	parents	with	lower
aspiration	(e.g.,	aspiration	<	50)	are	more	likely	to	get	into	their	preferred	school	even	though	not	in	any	school's	catchment,	both
because	the	distance	to	the	nearest	school	is	likely	to	be	smaller	(because	there	are	more	schools	deemed	satisfactory)	and
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because	there	are	fewer	other	applicants	ranking	that	school	as	most	preferred	(because	other	parents	are	more	likely	to	avoid
it).	The	failure	of	parents	with	aspiration	60–70	to	get	into	their	preferred	(i.e.,	top	ranked)	school	is	reflected	in	their	greater
allocation	distances	than	any	other	aspiration	class	(Figure	4b).	Furthermore,	only	approximately	3%	of	parents	with	aspiration
60–70	move,	and	many	remain	stuck	in	the	position	of	having	higher	than	average	aspiration	but	not	being	'in	the	right	place'
(spatially)	when	they	initially	arrive	in	the	model	environment	(because	of	location	constraints).	These	parents	have	aspirations
'too	high'	relative	to	their	ability	to	move	into	preferred	school	catchments.
5.8 The	question	then	arises;	how	might	school	allocation	rules	or	policies	be	modified	to	help	those	parents	with	above	average,	but
not	very	high,	aspiration	(and	therefore	mobility)	get	into	better	schools	(or	at	least	schools	they	want)?	One	way	might	be	to
increase	the	standards	of	schools	so	that	a	greater	number	meet	the	aspirations	of	parents.	In	so	doing,	the	number	of	schools
that	parents	with	above	average	but	not	very	high	aspiration	deem	satisfactory	to	send	their	child	to	will	increase	and	the	danger
of	not	being	in	a	school	catchment	should	decrease.	To	investigate	this	we	examine	a	scenario	in	which	we	run	the	model	as	for
Rule	Set	1	(Table	3)	but	with	a	greater	mean	school	value-added	of	0.2	(although	with	the	same	standard	deviation	as	previously
of	0.1).	Results	for	this	'improved	school	standards'	scenario	indicate	that	increased	ability	of	schools	to	raise	child-attainment
produces	changes	in	strategies	for	parents	with	higher	aspiration	and	decreases	the	proportion	of	parents	with	aspiration	60–70
that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their	preferred	school	(Figure	6,	compare	to	Figure	4c).	Furthermore,	this	increase	in	mean	school
value-added	increases	the	proportions	of	parents	in	other	aspiration	classes	that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	a	preferred	school,
resulting	in	a	more	even	distribution	of	failure	across	the	aspiration	classes.
Figure	6.	Relationship	between	aspiration	and	strategy	at	parent-level	for	'improved	school	standards'	scenario.
Prospects	for	future	work
5.9 The	'improved	school	standards'	scenario	is	just	one	example	of	the	kinds	of	scenarios	we	can	examine	with	the	model.	The
model	could	also	be	used	to	explore	alternative	school	allocation	rules	and	policies,	which	might	include	random	lotteries	for
school	allocation	(e.g.,	Allen	et	al.	2013),	opening	'free'	schools	that	may	use	aptitude	as	a	selection	criterion	(e.g.,	Hatcher	2011),
or	the	closure	of	under-performing	schools.	Future	changes	to	the	model	might	extend	it	to	enable	representation	of	other	criteria
used	in	UK	state	school	allocation	(e.g.,	religious	faith,	attendance	of	siblings).
5.10 The	model	presented	here	uses	only	a	single	parent	agent	variable	(aspiration	for	high	educational	attainment)	to	simultaneously
represent	the	goals	of	parents	and	the	constraints	on	their	ability	to	meet	those	goals.	However,	there	are	many	factors	underlying
where	families	want	and/or	are	able	to	live	and	which	schools	they	perceive	as	desirable	for	their	child	to	attend.	For	example,
educational	aspiration	varies	by	class	and	ethnicity	(Butler	and	Hamnett	2011,	2012)	and	the	ability	to	move	house	to	achieve
these	aspirations	is	an	economic	question	influenced	by	the	housing	market.	The	representation	of	agents	and	their	environment
with	multiple	attributes	that	more	accurately	reflect	motivations	and	constraints	is	needed.	There	is	no	reason	why	aspiration	for
educational	attainment	and	economic	wealth	should	be	correlated	and	future	modelling	may	explore	how	variations	in
distributions	of	these	factors	result	in	different	winners	and	losers	through	time	and	across	space.	Improving	this	representation
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will	require	individual-level	data	on	attributes,	preferences	and	allocations.	These	improvements	in	representation	and	data	would
also	allow	an	investigation	of	motivations	for	school	choice	beyond	exam	results	alone,	allowing	agents	to	identify	preferences
based	upon	school	ethnic	and	socio-economic	composition	and	the	attributes	of	other	parents	that	send	their	child	to	a	school
(although	that	is	in	some	ways	represented	here	through	the	Att=Asp	assumption).
5.11 What	we	have	been	able	to	show	here	using	a	simple,	abstract	agent-based	model	that	represents	individual	parents	in
disaggregated	manner,	and	which	was	not	immediately	apparent	at	the	outset,	is	how	constraints	on	individuals'	movements,
when	combined	with	distance	allocation	rules,	produce	winners	and	losers	that	are	not	directly	correlated	to	the	individuals'
attributes.	That	is,	it	is	not	agents	with	lowest	aspiration	that	are	least	satisfied	with	their	school	allocation	outcomes,	and	instead
it	is	parent	agents	with	above	average,	but	not	very	high,	aspiration	that	fail	to	get	their	child	into	their	preferred	school	more
frequently	than	other	parents.	Using	disaggregated,	agent-based	simulation	approaches	like	this	allows	investigation	of
individual-level	outcomes	of	system	level	policies.	When	informed	more	directly	by	individual-level	data,	and	used	in	combination
with	scenarios	of	different	education	policies,	this	modelling	approach	will	allow	us	to	more	rigorously	investigate	the
consequences	of	those	policies	for	education	inequalities	across	space	and	through	time.
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	Notes
	1	Other	criteria	such	as	the	attendance	of	siblings	at	a	school	and	special	educational	needs	are	also	considered	but	influence	a
very	minor	proportion	of	all	applicants.
2	Data	from:	Department	for	Education.	Secondary	School	GCSE	Performance	Tables	2010:	Barking	and	Dagenham.	HMSO.
2011.	URL:	http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/archive/schools_10/pdf_10/301.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.
(Archived	by	WebCite®	at	http://www.webcitation.org/6BVNtJTe9);	Department	for	Education.	Secondary	School	GCSE
Performance	Tables	2011:	Barking	and	Dagenham.	HMSO.	2012.	URL:
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/2011/download/pdf/301_ks4.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by
WebCite®	at	http://www.webcitation.org/6BVNziv1Z);	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	The	Right	Secondary	School:
Information	for	parents	about	moving	to	secondary	schools	in	2013.	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	2012.	URL:
http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Education/Admissions/Documents/RSS2013.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by	WebCite®	at
http://www.webcitation.org/6BVOM2pTi);	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	The	Right	Secondary	School:	Information
for	parents	about	moving	to	secondary	schools	in	2012.	London	Borough	of	Barking	and	Dagenham.	2011.	URL:
http://www.lbbd.gov.uk/Education/Admissions/Documents/RSS2012.pdf.	Accessed:	2012-10-18.	(Archived	by	WebCite®	at
http://www.webcitation.org/6BVOUK84I)
3	http://www.openabm.org/model/3364/version/1/
4	In	real	schools,	pupils	in	year	11	may	be	aged	15	or	16	depending	on	their	birth	date.	However,	the	temporal	resolution	of	the
model	is	one	year	and	child	ages	are	updated	simultaneously	so	we	assume	pupils	are	aged	11	during	school	year	7,	12	during
year	8,	etc.	until	being	age	15	during	year	11.
5	Note	that	ranking	strategies	for	both	moving	and	application	include	situations	in	which	parents	do	not	consider	any	schools
satisfactory	to	send	their	child	to.	In	this	unsatisfactory	situation	in	the	real	world,	parents	may	have	the	means	to	move	to	a
location	outside	their	current	LEA	where	they	think	they	their	child	will	get	a	place	at	a	satisfactory	state	school.	Alternatively,	if
they	have	the	means	they	may	remove	their	child	from	the	state	school	system	and	send	them	into	private	schooling.	Neither	of
these	options	is	represented	by	the	current	model	structure,	which	is	essentially	a	closed	system.
6	In	reality,	school	places	are	allocated	by	the	Local	Education	Authority	(LEA)	and	not	by	individual	schools.	However,	the
school-driven	allocation	procedure	used	in	the	model	here	is	consistent	with	the	logic	used	by	an	LEA	and	does	not	require	the
use	of	ancillary	model	objects	other	than	schools	and	parents.
7	In	the	table	m	is	mean	regression	coefficient	of	a	linear	regression	between	the	two	variables,	p	is	the	mean	number	of
timesteps	in	which	p	>	0.05	for	the	relationship	between	the	variables,	and	r2	is	the	mean	coefficient	of	determination	for	the
linear	regression	model.	All	values	are	for	80	timesteps	in	25	model	replicates.
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8	In	the	table	m	is	mean	regression	coefficient	of	a	linear	regression	between	the	two	variables,	p	is	the	mean	number	of
timesteps	in	which	p	>	0.05	for	the	relationship	between	the	variables,	and	r2	is	the	mean	coefficient	of	determination	for	the
linear	regression	model.	All	values	are	for	80	timesteps	in	25	model	replicates.
9	Note	that	we	present	only	seven	combinations,	as	the	combination	with	all	three	assumptions	true	is	equivalent	to	Rule	Set	1	in
Table	3.
	References
	ALLEN,	R.	and	Vignoles,	A.	(2007).	What	should	an	index	of	school	segregation	measure?	Oxford	Review	of	Education,	33(5),
643–668.	[doi:10.1080/03054980701366306]
ALLEN,	R.,	Burgess,	S.	and	McKenna,	L.	(2010).	The	early	impact	of	Brighton	and	Hove's	school	admission	reforms.	Centre	for
Market	and	Public	Organisation.	Working	Paper	No.	10/244
ALLEN,	R.,	Burgess,	S.	and	McKenna,	L.	(2013).	The	short-run	impact	of	using	lotteries	for	school	admissions:	early	results	from
Brighton	and	Hove's	reforms.	Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers	38(1),	149–166.	[doi:10.1111/j.1475-
5661.2012.00511.x]
BRADLEY,	J.E.,	Kirby,	A.M.	and	Taylor,	P.J.	(1978).	Distance	decay	and	dental	decay:	A	study	of	dental	health	among	primary
school	children	in	Newcastle	upon	Tyne.	Regional	Studies,	12(5),	529–540.	[doi:10.1080/09595237800185501]
BURGESS,	S.	and	Briggs,	A.	(2010).	School	assignment,	school	choice	and	social	mobility.	Economics	of	Education	Review,
29(4),	639–649.	[doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.10.011]
BUTLER,	T.	and	Hamnett,	C.	(2007).	The	Geography	of	Education.	Urban	Studies,	44(7),	1161–74.
[doi:10.1080/00420980701329174]
BUTLER,	T.	and	Hamnett,	C.	(2011).	Ethnicity,	Class	and	Aspiration:	Understanding	London's	new	East	End.	The	Policy	Press,
Bristol.
BUTLER,	T.	and	Hamnett,	C.	(2012).	Praying	for	success?	Faith	schools	and	school	choice	in	East	London.	Geoforum	43(6),
1242–1253.	[doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.03.010]
CONNOLLY,	P.	(2006).	The	effects	of	social	class	and	ethnicity	on	gender	differences	in	GCSE	attainment:	A	secondary	analysis
of	the	Youth	Cohort	Study	of	England	and	Wales	1997–2001.	British	Educational	Research	Journal,	32(1),	3–21.
[doi:10.1080/01411920500401963]
EPSTEIN,	J.	M.	(1999).	Agent-based	computational	models	and	generative	social	science.	Complexity,	4,	41–60.
[doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0526(199905/06)4:5<41::AID-CPLX9>3.0.CO;2-F]
EPSTEIN,	J.M.	(2006).	Generative	Social	Science.	Princeton	University	Press,	Princeton.
FOSSETT,	M.	and	Dietrich,	D.R.	(2009).	Effects	of	city	size,	shape,	and	form,	and	neighborhood	size	and	shape	in	agent-based
models	of	residential	segregation:	are	Schelling-style	preference	effects	robust?	Environment	and	planning.	B,	Planning	&
design,	36(1),	149–169.	[doi:10.1068/b33042]
GALE,	D.	and	Shapley,	L.S.	(1962).	College	admissions	and	the	stability	of	marriage.	The	American	Mathematical	Monthly,	69(1),
9–15.	[doi:10.2307/2312726]
GIBBONS,	S.	and	Telhaj,	S.	(2007).	Are	Schools	Drifting	Apart?	Intake	Stratification	in	English	Secondary	Schools.	Urban
Studies,	44(7),	1281–1280.	[doi:10.1080/00420980701302346]
GUDSON,	K.	(2011).	Education	Policy,	Space	and	the	City:	Markets	and	the	(In)visibility	of	Race.	Routledge,	London.
HAMNETT,	C.,	Ramsden,	M.	and	Butler,	T.	(2007).	Social	background,	ethnicity,	school	composition	and	educational	attainment
in	East	London.	Urban	Studies,	44(7),	1255–1280.	[doi:10.1080/00420980701302395]
HAMNETT,	C.	and	Butler,	T.	(2011).	'Geography	matters':	the	role	distance	plays	in	reproducing	educational	inequality	in	East
London.	Transactions	of	the	Institute	of	British	Geographers,	36(4),	479–500.	[doi:10.1111/j.1475-5661.2011.00444.x]
HARLAND,	K.	and	Heppenstall,	A.J.	(2012).	Using	Agent-Based	Models	for	Education	Planning:	Is	the	UK	Education	System
Agent	Based?	In:	A.J.	Heppenstall	Heppenstall,	A.T.	Crooks,	L.M.	See,	and	M.	Batty	(Eds.),	Agent-Based	Models	of	Geographical
Systems,	(pp.	481–497)	Springer.	[doi:10.1007/978-90-481-8927-4_23]
HARRIS,	R.J.	and	Johnston,	R.J.	(2008).	Primary	schools,	markets	and	choice:	studying	polarization	and	the	core	catchment
areas	of	schools.	Applied	Spatial	Analysis	and	Policy	1(1),	59–84.	[doi:10.1007/s12061-008-9002-8]
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/1/10.html 19 15/10/2015
HATCHER,	R.	(2011).	The	Conservative-Liberal	Democrat	Coalition	government's	"free	schools"	in	England.	Educational
Review,	63(4),	485–503.	[doi:10.1080/00131911.2011.616635]
LAURIE,	A.J.	and	Jaggi,	N.K.	(2003).	Role	of	'vision'	in	neighbourhood	racial	segregation:	a	variant	of	the	Schelling	segregation
model.	Urban	Studies,	40(13),	2687–2704.	[doi:10.1080/0042098032000146849]
MAROULIS,	S.,	Guimerà,	R.,	Petry,	H.,	Stringer,	M.J.,	Gomez	L.M.,	Amaral,	L.A.N.	and	Wilensky,	U.	(2010a).	Complex	Systems
View	of	Educational	Policy	Research.	Science,	330,	38–89.	[doi:10.1126/science.1195153]
MAROULIS,	S.,	Bakshyy,	E.,	Gomez,	L.	and	Wilensky,	U.	(2010b).	An	Agent-Based	Model	of	Intra-District	Public	School	Choice.
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/papers/choice.pdf.	Archived	at:	http://www.webcitation.org/6BsXYmTOL
MCLAFFERTY,	S.	(1982).	Urban	Structure	and	Geographical	Access	to	Public	Services.	Annals	of	the	Association	of	American
Geographers,	72(3),	347–354.	[doi:10.1111/j.1467-8306.1982.tb01830.x]
MILLINGTON,	J.D.A.,	O'Sullivan,	D.,	Perry,	G.L.W.	(2012).	Model	histories:	Narrative	explanation	in	generative	simulation
modelling.	Geoforum,	43,	1025–1034.	[doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.06.017]
O'SULLIVAN,	D.	(2008)	Geographical	information	science:	agent-based	models.	Progress	in	Human	Geography,	32,	541–558.
[doi:10.1177/0309132507086879]
O'SULLIVAN,	D.	(2009).	Changing	Neighborhoods—Neighborhoods	Changing	A	Framework	for	Spatially	Explicit	Agent-Based
Models	of	Social	Systems.	Sociological	Methods	&	Research,	37(4),	498–530.	[doi:10.1177/0049124109334793]
PORTUGALI,	J.	(2000).	Self-organization	and	the	city.	Springer.	[doi:10.1007/978-3-662-04099-7]
SIMINI,	F.,	González,	M.C.,	Maritan,	A.	and	Barabási,	A.L.	(2012)	A	universal	model	for	mobility	and	migration	patterns.	Nature,
484(7392),	96–100.	[doi:10.1038/nature10856]
TANG,	Y.,	Parsons,	S.	and	Sklar,	E.	(2007)	Modeling	Human	Education	Data:	From	Equation-Based	Modeling	to	Agent-Based
Modeling	In:	Antunes,	L.	and	Takadama,	K.	(Eds.)	MABS	2006,	Lecture	Notes	in	Computer	Science,	4442	41–56.
THRUPP,	M.,	Lauder,	H.	and	Robinson,	T.	(2002).	School	composition	and	peer	effects.	International	Journal	of	Educational
Research,	37(5),	483–504.	[doi:10.1016/S0883-0355(03)00016-8]
WILLMS,	J.	D.	(2010).	School	composition	and	contextual	effects	on	student	outcomes.	The	Teachers	College	Record,	112(4),
3–4.
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/17/1/10.html 20 15/10/2015
